မွတ္တိုင္သစ္...

Annulment of elections

accuses the military of breaking its promise to hand power over to a civilian government after elections and refusing to give up its seat in power.

accuses NLD of backtracking on its promise that the elected body would be a constitutional writing body and not a legislative one

The common understanding of the military’s annulment of election results in 1990 is that it refused to accept it had lost to the NLD. However the military had announced prior to elections on 9 June 1989 that elected representatives are to draw up a constitution before a transfer of power, as a new constitution was necessary for a new government to be strong. The military decided it could not transfer power until such stability was guaranteed (9 June 1989, 43rd SLORC Press Conference).

However the military had backtracked from its plan to hand power over to a civilian government elected by the people - as stated in the election law No.14/89 and reconfirmed in other statements. Even though the opposition were aware that the new elected body would be a constitutional writing body and not a legislative one, it still insisted that “the sovereign power of this National Assembly is absolute” and “shall be practiced without reservation” in its Election Manifesto on 9 November 1989. Furthermore, Aung San Suu Kyi said in an interview with Dominic Faulder on 1 July 1989 “Whoever is elected will first have to draw up a constitution that will have to be adopted before the transfer of power. They haven’t said how the constitution will be adopted. It could be through a referendum, but that could be months and months, if not years. That’s why provisions for the transfer of power are so important.”

The battleground was drawn after elections in the statement by NLD’s Gandhi Hall Declaration 29 July 1990 and SLORC Declaration No. 1/90, 27 July 1990 whereby both sides reiterated their opposing demands. However on 30 October 1990 Daw Myint Myint Khin, a senior member of the NLD, had “signed Friday [27 October 1990] an order of the SLORC yielding to its plans for drawing up a constitution.

Suppression of the opposition

accuses military of suppressing the opposition to maintain its hold on power

accuses opposition as enemies of the state, threatening peace, stability and the unity of the country

SLORC spokesmen accuses opposition of making unacceptably divisive and hostile remarks

• Syriam, 18 March 1989: “There are two sides within the Defence Forces: one side represents the Defence Force personnel who honourably stand on the side of the people, while the dishonourable ones prolong their hold on power.
• Kemmendine, 14 June 1989: The Defence Forces are divorced from the people and also divided within because they have been used to preserve the power of U Ne Win (the retired Chairman of the former ruling BSPP).
• NLD headquarters, 19 July 1989: “We have a fascist government in power… They are acting now like a fascist government and like fascists the only language they understand is confrontation.

Threats to government

• Distribution of information criticising and undercutting the military’s democratic efforts
• the Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP) -- a panel set up in September 1998 to represent a parliament of members elected in 1990, challenged the power of the military in government
• Aung San Suu Kyi’s call for international sanctions and shaming it in the international community disrupted democratising efforts within the country

Threats to the military

• NLD Spokesman U Kyi Maung made reference to the holding of a Nuremberg type trial in Yangon after the NLD came to power to a foreign journalist (Asiaweek, 13 July 1990).
• Alleged demand of young Buddhist monks and others opposed to the regime that the army be broken into smaller, regionally based units and that all currently serving officers from the rank of colonel up would be removed from office.
• Foreign pressure to establish an NLD government, release political opponents from detention, improve human rights is part of a plan to weaken the army’s capacity to continue to carry out its goal of maintaining national independence.

Threats to national security

• accuses the opposition groups, backed by foreign powers, of setting off several bomb attacks on Burma violent protestors responsible for disrupting law and order, e.g. kangaroo courts and looting 1988

Imprisonment of ASSK

accuses military of keeping Aung San Suu Kyi to eliminate threat to its power

• the trial of ASSK after the intrusion of American John Yettaw case just weeks before the end of her term is seen to be part of the military’s plan to keep Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest during elections.

accuses ASSK of instigating unrest and using western power to threaten the junta.

• Most recent trial of ASSK following the intrusion of American John Yettaw is seen to be a ploy by internal and external anti-government elements against policy reviews by US, Japan and Europe.

• ASSK is imprisoned under the Law to Safeguard the State Against the Dangers of Those Desiring to Cause Subversive Acts (Article 10a) - Arrests in 1989, 2000 and 2003 followed ASSK’s campaigns and outspoken speeches criticising the government. She was accused of stirring up the public’s discontent against the government and provoking social unrest. The worst case in 2003 saw a violent breakout between government supporters with NLD supporters leaving ? dead and ? injured.
• In 1988 Khin Nyunt referred to the NLD as a communist front provoking political unrest.
• Accuses ASSK and NLD for being intransigent, unpatriotic, power crazy and selfish, as well as becoming stooges and puppets of “neo-colonialist powers” that are bent on “enslaving” Burma.
• ASSK is unacceptable in national politics because of her long residences abroad and criticisms of the army in 1988-89.

Junta’s democratic intent

accuses SPDC of using the 7 step road map to institutionalize military rule in government

• The evolving strategy of the SLORC is to stall for time while attenuating the opposition through the arrest of the elected delegates and continued restrictions on public communication.
• In 1992 the national constitutional convention took nine months and the subsequent gestation of guiding principles by the national convention was prolonged and frequently interrupted running on for three years with no end yet in sight.
• Less than one sixth of the more than seven hundred selected delegates to the national convention were persons who had been elected in 1990, a fact which raised concern in the UK general assembly resolutions regarding Myanmar.

• The legitimacy enterprise and cause for concern in the UN general assembly debate was the sixth objective of the national convention ‘participation of the tatmadaw in the leading role in national politics in the future state.
• 2008 constitution provides significant powers for the military and institutionalises its position in government.

Junta has defined itself as a transitional government with an objective of safeguarding peace and security while seeing to the overwhelming desire of the people for democracy

• Upon taking power, SLORC declaration 1/88 and General Saw Maung’s address to the nation stated that the military did not wish to hang onto power but to maintain law and order, and to hold multiparty elections
• SPDC Chairman, Senior General Than Shwe, Burma’s military did not “crave for power,” and that its “ultimate aim is to hand over the state power to the people.” As Than Shwe explained in his speech on Myanmar’s 63rd Armed Forces Day on March 27, 2008, the military was “compelled” to assume state responsibilities due to “unavoidable circumstances.”

Credit to Mizzzima: http://www.mizzima.com